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In this paper, we consider what is commonly referred to as Leibniz’s 
argument for primitive concepts. After presenting and criticizing (in sections 1 
and 2) one recent rather straightforward way of interpreting this argument, by 
Paul Lodge and Stephen Puryear, which takes the argument to be merely 
about the structure of concepts, we offer an alternative way of looking at the 
argument. We think it is best seen as being fundamentally about the relation 
between thought and reality. In order to prepare the ground for our 
reconstruction (which we present in section 5), we have to introduce his view 
of ideas or concepts (section 3), as well as some metaphysical principles 
concerning reality-dependence (section 4). 
 
1. The Argument 
In his early piece, Of an Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking, Leibniz offers the 
following argument for why, in his own terms, insofar as we conceive 
anything, there needs to be something that is conceived through itself: 
 
Whatever is thought by us is either conceived through itself [per se], or 
involves the concept of another. 
Whatever is involved in the concept of another is again either 
conceived through itself or involves the concept of another; and so on. 
So one must either proceed to infinity, or all thoughts are resolved 
into those which are conceived through themselves. 
If nothing is conceived through itself, nothing will be conceived at 
all. For what is conceived only through others will be conceived only in 
so far as those others are conceived, and so on; so that we may only be 
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said to conceive something in actuality when we arrive at those things 
which are conceived through themselves.1 (A VI.iv 156/MP 1–2.) 
 
The expressions “conceived through itself” and “conceived through 
something else” may at first sight appear a bit obscure. One initial worry is 
that there seems to be some ambiguity in Leibniz’s formulation. He can be 
taken to be talking about what we are thinking about, about things conceived, 
on the one hand, or about our thinking or conceiving of those things, on the 
other.  
A natural way to try to make Leibniz’s claims clearer is to take the 
argument to be about concepts, i.e. about something in our minds, about the 
constituents of our thoughts, and to understand the argument as trying to 
show that there has to be primitive or simple concepts in order for there to be 
complex concepts. As textual evidence for this kind of reading one can refer to 
another of Leibniz’s early texts, An Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia, where he 
writes that “we can have no derivative concepts except by the aid of a 
primitive concept.” (A VI.iv 529/MP 7.) On this view, for a concept to be 
complex (or derivative) is for it to have constituent concepts into which it can 
be analyzed. For a concept to be simple or primitive (we will use these terms 
interchangeably here) is for it to lack such constituents. For example, the 
concept man is complex because it can be analyzed into the concepts animal 
and rational. Similarly, the concept animal is complex because it can be 
analyzed into, say, the concepts corporeal and living. The point of the argument 
would be that relatively more complex concepts (such as man) result from a 
combination of relatively less complex concepts (such as animal), which in turn 
                                                
1 It may be useful to have the full quote in the original Latin:  
 
Quicquid cogitatur a nobis aut per se concipitur, aut alterius conceptum involvit. 
Quicquid in alterius conceptu involvitur id rursus vel per se concipitur vel 
alterius conceptum involvit. Et ita porro. 
Itaque vel eundum est in infinitum, vel cogitationes omnes resolvuntur in eas 
quae per se concipiuntur. 
Si nihil per se concipitur, nihil omnio concipietur. Nam quod non nisi per alia 
concipitur, in tantum concipietur in quantum alia illa concipiuntur et hoc rursum 
ita: ac proinde tum demum actu ipso aliquid concipere dicemur, cum in ea quae 
per se concipiuntur incidemus. 
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result from other relatively less complex concepts, until some simple concepts 
are reached, which are not the result of any combination.  
Such a reading is offered by Paul Lodge and Stephen Puryear, who 
propose to clarify Leibniz’s argument by substituting “primitive concept” for 
“conceived through itself” and “complex concept” for “conceived through 
something else,” resulting in the following reconstruction of the Ars Magna 
argument:2 
 
(1) Every concept is either primitive or complex, i.e., composed of other 
concepts (assumption). 
(2) Every concept that composes a complex concept is itself either primitive 
or complex (from (1)). 
(3) Complex concepts are either composed of other concepts to infinity, or 
ultimately composed of primitives (from (2)).  
(4) Complex concepts are conceived only insofar as their constituents are 
conceived (assumption).  
(5) A complex concept is conceived only if it is ultimately composed of 
primitives  (from (4)). 
(6) If a complex concept is composed of other concepts to infinity, then it 
will not be conceived (from 5). 
 
This only establishes the conditional conclusion (6) and not the existence of 
primitive concepts. It seems, however, that Leibniz does intend the argument 
to show the existence of primitive concepts. As Lodge and Puryear 
(henceforth L&P) point out, he seems to rely on the following additional 
premise: 
 
(7) Some complex concepts are conceived (unstated assumption). 
 
This premise allows us to draw the intended conclusion: 
 
(8) Some complex concepts are not composed of other concepts to infinity 
(from (6), (7)). 
(9) Some concepts are ultimately composed of primitives (from (3), (8)). 
                                                
2 Lodge & Puryear 2006/7, 178. 
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(10) There are primitive concepts (from (9)). 
 
L&P’s reconstruction also serves to bring out some difficulties with the 
argument, which we will consider next. 
 
2. Some Problems with the Argument 
The first problem has to do with the fact that the argument does not only 
show that there are primitive concepts, but also that insofar as we conceive a 
complex concept we also conceive its primitive constituents. (This follows 
from (4).) It has been suggested that for Leibniz conceiving x implies 
awareness of x.3 If this is true, then it would further follow that in conceiving a 
complex concept, we are aware of all of its constituents, down to the 
primitives. To conceive a complex concept would mean that one is able to 
provide the full analysis of it. The problem is that Leibniz explicitly denies the 
last claim. He holds for example that we are aware of the concepts of colors 
without being aware of what they contain (this is distinctive of what he calls 
clear and confused concepts (e.g. A VI.iv 585f./AG 23f.)). In fact, Leibniz is 
rather skeptical of the possibility that we would ever be capable of analyzing 
our complex concepts into primitives. As he explains in An Introduction to a 
Secret Encyclopaedia: “A concept is primitive when it cannot be analysed into 
others […] But it can be doubted whether any concept of this kind appears 
distinctly to men.” (A VI.iv 529/MP 7; cf. A VI.iv 590/AG 26.)  
L&P’s main aim is to show that this alleged problem is not a problem. 
The reason is that it is incorrect to ascribe to Leibniz the thesis that 
conceiving x implies awareness of x.4 In that case, there seems to be no 
conflict between, on the one hand, claiming that in order to conceive a 
complex concept we need to conceive all of its constituents, and, on the other 
hand, denying that we are capable of analyzing all complex concepts. At a 
general level the notion of unconscious conceiving fits nicely with Leibniz’s 
thesis that much of our mental life is unconscious. More particularly, L&P 
                                                
3 See Plaisted 2003, 338. He relies on Discourse on Metaphysics 27: “the expressions in our soul, 
whether we conceive them or not, can be called ideas, but those we conceive or form can be 
called notions, concepts [conceptus].” (A VI.iv 1572/AG 59.) 
4 They persuasively argue that Discourse 27 does not constitute textual evidence for this thesis 
(Lodge & Puryear 2006/7, 193). 
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point to the fact we can have and use concepts without being aware of them, in 
line with how Leibniz in the New Essays claims that we use the principle of 
contradiction without being aware of the principle or its constituent concepts 
(impossibility, being, etc.) (NE 76, 83–84). L&P do not go so far as claiming that 
conceiving a concept is just having or using it, but it is not quite clear what, in 
their view, is involved in conceiving a concept in addition to merely having or 
using it. One might worry that this additional aspect of unconscious 
conceiving will come close to having the analysis of a concept, which (as we 
have seen) would be problematic. While we agree with L&P that conceiving 
for Leibniz does imply awareness, their reading leaves the nature of 
conceiving somewhat obscure. 
Another difficulty with the argument, also noted by L&P, concerns the 
crucial step from (4) to (5). There are in fact two related problems here. The 
first has to do with the motivation for (4): why should it be the case that in 
order to conceive a complex concept, I need to conceive all of the constituents 
of that concept? Couldn’t I conceive, for example, gold without conceiving all 
of its constituents? The second problem is that even if we accept (4) this does 
not rule out the possibility of infinitely complex concepts. Hence we cannot 
from (4) conclude that (5) – that a complex concept is conceived only if it is 
ultimately composed of primitives.  
In order to motivate assumption (4) as well as to understand the move 
from (4) to (5), L&P suggest that Leibniz accepts the following further thesis 
concerning concepts, which they call the Inheritance Thesis: 
 
(IT) Complex concepts inherit (or borrow) their content from the 
concepts that compose them. (Lodge & Puryear 2006/7, 189.) 
 
They claim that if we accept (IT), then (4) follows: “If complex concepts must 
(continually) borrow their content from the constituents, then it would stand 
to reason that we cannot conceive a complex concept without in the process 
conceiving its constituents. For in grasping the (borrowed) content of a 
complex concept, we would in effect be grasping the content of its 
components.” (Lodge & Puryear 2006/7, 189.) Support for attributing (IT) to 
Leibniz is supposed to be found in a simile he offers in Ars magna as an 
illustration of the argument: 
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I will illustrate this by a simile. I give you a hundred crowns, to be 
received from Titus; Titus will send you to Caius, Caius to Maevius; but 
if you are perpetually sent on in this way you will never be said to have 
received anything. (A VI.iv 156/MP 2.) 
 
According to L&P this continual deferring of the payment can be 
characterized as a matter of the payment’s being borrowed or inherited. The 
simile, they claim, also allows us to see how (IT) helps to explain the move to 
(5), that is, how the regress can be blocked: “Just as nothing will be received at 
all unless one of the people to whom we are sent actually pays […] so also 
nothing will be conceived at all unless the complex concept ultimately resolves 
into concepts that do not inherit their content from others, since conceiving 
requires that there be a content to conceive.” (Lodge & Puryear 2006/7, 189.) 
There appears, however, to be something wrong with the suggestion 
that the simile straightforwardly illustrates (IT). L&P overlook what seems to 
be an important disanalogy between the two. In the simile I am given 100 
crowns, but in order to receive the money I am perpetually sent onto new 
people. This means that I haven’t received anything until there is someone 
who actually pays. (IT), on the other hand, assumes that complex concepts 
(such as gold or triangle) have content, even if that content is borrowed or 
inherited from its constituents. If complex concepts have content, something – 
some content – seems to be received already at the first stage, unlike in the 
simile, where nothing is received. While it may be true that the chain in the 
simile must terminate – if some money is given, there has to be some money 
to be collected – this is not so in the case of (IT). Given that there is content at 
the first stage, it is hard to see why the fact that this content is borrowed from 
the constituents would rule out a situation where those constituents in turn 
borrow their content from their constituents, and so on to infinity.  
This means that that even if we accept that (IT) helps to motivate (4), it 
does not explain the move to (5), contrary to what L&P suggest. For in order 
to use (IT) to infer that a complex concept is conceived only if it is ultimately 
composed of primitives, the thesis would have to entail that there is no 
content at all – nothing received – until we reach some primitive concept, 
which, as we just saw, does not appear to be the case. The disanalogy between 
the simile and (IT) also means that we are left without a satisfactory 
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understanding of what Leibniz takes the point of the simile to be: how exactly 
is it intended to illustrate the argument? We believe that L&P’s appeal to the 
notion of borrowing does in fact contain an important insight, but that it 
needs to be developed in a different direction (as we will argue in section 4 
below) in order for it to help us with Leibniz’s argument. 
There is a third, and perhaps even deeper worry, about L&P’s 
reconstruction. The conclusion of the argument reads: “we may only be said 
to conceive something in actuality when we arrive at those things which are 
conceived through themselves.” For purposes of clarification L&P substitute 
(as we have seen) Leibniz’s original formulation with (10): “There are 
primitive concepts.” The problem is that these two formulations do not seem 
to be equivalent. The latter is a claim about the mereological structure of 
concepts: complex concepts have to be composed of simple or primitive 
concepts. The former is a claim about the connection between cognition and 
external reality: in order for us to conceive anything there has to be some thing 
that is conceived through itself.  
It is true that in the argument Leibniz does not explicitly use the Latin 
res, but rather the pronouns quicquid, alterius, ea, etc. However, it seems clear 
that these are intended to refer to some external reality (things), rather than to 
something mental (concepts): in Ars magna Leibniz goes onto argue that that 
which is conceived through itself is “God himself [Deus ipse]” (A VI.iv 
158/MP 2); in An Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia he talks explicitly about 
“the thing which is conceived through itself [rei quae per se concipitur], namely the 
supreme substance, that is, God” (A VI.iv 528–9/MP 7; our emphasis). The 
claim is then that in order to conceive anything, we need to conceive some (or 
rather the) basic reality.5 We will attempt to make some more sense of this idea 
in section 3 below. For now we are simply interested in bringing out the 
significance of Leibniz’s emphasis on conceiving a thing through itself. (It is 
also worth noticing that the idea of there being a single primitive (God) does 
not fit very well with reading the argument as a matter of the mereology of 
concepts. For if the role of primitives is to serve as the basic building-blocks of 
                                                
5 There seems to be an interesting connection to an idea that Olli Koistinen has brought out in 
Descartes (as well as in Spinoza and Kant): ”For something to be possible, there must already be 
some existent things on which the possibility depends, and through which the possibility can be 
understood.” (Koistinen 2014, 237.) 
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complex concepts, then there would have to be several (maybe infinitely 
many) primitives.)6  
At this point it may be suggested that we are making too much of the 
contrast between, on the one hand, talk of concepts and, on the other hand, 
of things. After all, L&P do not mean to deny that Leibniz is concerned with 
conceiving things. In fact, they insist that the locution “conceiving (of) a 
concept” is “shorthand for something like ‘conceiving a thing through a 
concept’” (Lodge & Puryear 2006/7, 178 fn. 5). Still, it is hard to see that the 
idea of conceiving things has any substantial role to play in their 
reconstruction. Their presentation of the steps of the argument seems entirely 
consistent with staying neutral with respect to the question of whether there is 
any relationship between concepts and things. The argument appears, as 
already noted, simply to concern the structure of concepts. 
This seems to leave Leibniz’s position vulnerable to Kant’s well-known 
objection in the Critique of  Pure Reason that Leibniz created a mere “intellectual 
system of the world” (A 270/B 326). Famously, Kant claimed that the 
problem is that Leibniz thought of himself as able to arrive at objects merely 
through considering their concepts, failing to see that there is a gap between 
concept and object – that concepts alone do not allow us to reach reality. This 
is not the place to go further into the details of Kant’s criticism. Our point is 
simply that the contrast we have drawn attention to between concept-talk and 
thing-talk, cannot simply be overcome by asserting that we conceive things 
through concepts. At first sight, the claim that we conceive a primitive 
concept does not in itself license the inference to there being some thing that is 
conceived through that concept. And what seems important in Leibniz’s 
conclusion is precisely that we arrive at things. 
We believe that the difficulty just described can be addressed by taking a 
closer look at the central terms used in the argument. This will also provide 
help with the other problems noted (the nature of conceiving, as well as the 
step from (4) to (5)). 
                                                
6 In later writings Leibniz tends to talk about the primitives as the various attributes of God (e.g. 
A VI.iv 590/AG 26), which may perhaps be more easily fitted into a picture of Leibniz as 
engaging the question of the structure of concepts. To us it seems, however, more plausible to 
read the later texts in light of the earlier, so “attributes” refer to things or reality rather than to 
concepts. Indeed, this would be a natural reading from the perspective of Scholastic theology, 
which understood God’s attributes as following from – or even as aspects of – the divine essence.  
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3. Concepts, Ideas, and Expression 
While it is natural to read the argument as concerned with concepts, and 
Leibniz himself sometimes formulates the argument in terms of concepts, this 
can easily lead astray. We need to pay attention to some deep differences 
between what is for us a familiar way of taking ‘concept’ and Leibniz’s way of 
understanding that term. Nowadays philosophers tend to think (in some 
respects following Kant) that concepts themselves offer us only a very “thin” 
cognitive relation to reality – they are mainly instruments we use in our 
thinking in order to pick up objects for our thoughts. We may be able to 
arrive at some analytic judgments on the basis of having the concept of, say, a 
cat – maybe that cats are animals and some other information of that sort. 
But in order to know more about cats, or in order to arrive at synthetic 
judgments about cats, we would have to go “outside” our concept, and rely 
on experience of the objects we pick up with the help of the concept.  
Now, even if Leibniz is well aware of the need for experience in our 
knowledge of the world, his view of concepts is fundamentally different from 
many later views. In order to see this we can consider Leibniz’s attempts to 
define the term ‘idea’ (a term that is closely related to the term ‘concept’). 
One such attempt is in a short paper with the title “What is an idea?”, which 
Leibniz wrote in 1678. Leibniz starts there by saying that “by the term idea 
we understand something which is in our mind” (A VI.iv 1370/L 207). But 
not everything in our mind is an idea: there are also “thoughts, perceptions, 
and affections”. The latter are occurrent states, but ideas are not: “an idea 
consists, not in some act, but in the faculty of thinking”. To have an idea of 
something is to be able to think about it. 
Leibniz argues, however, that this is not enough to define what it is to 
have ideas. One must still introduce the notion of expression: an idea of a thing 
must express the thing. The expression relation, as Leibniz explains it in 
“What is an idea?”, seems to be a very general cognitive relation: x expresses y 
if and only if “we can pass from a consideration of the relations in the 
expression [x] to a knowledge of the corresponding properties of the thing 
expressed” (A VI.iv 1370/L 207). This generality means that Leibniz can 
apply the notion to many, quite different cases: the model of a machine 
expresses the machine itself, an algebraic equation expresses a circle or some 
other figure, speech expresses thoughts, characters express numbers. 
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Ideas, however, are in certain respect quite peculiar as expressions.7 The 
most important peculiarity is that the expression relation between an idea and 
a thing is a necessary and internal relation. It may be possible to use a model 
of a machine as a model of some other machines as well. An idea of x, 
however, is essentially, in virtue of what it is, an idea of x and not of anything 
else. For Leibniz, this means that there is a connection between the 
individuation of ideas and the individuation of objects: it is not possible to 
individuate the idea of x independently of x. We could call this dependence 
individuative expressivism.8 
For Leibniz this notion of idea has far reaching implications:  
 
That the ideas of things are in us means therefore nothing but that God, 
the creator alike of the things and of the mind, has impressed a faculty 
of thinking, so that from its own operation it can derive what perfectly 
corresponds [respondeant] to what follows from things [sequuntur ex rebus]. 
Although, therefore, the idea of a circle is not similar to the circle, truths 
can be derived from it which would be confirmed beyond doubt by 
investigating a real circle. (A VI.iv 1371/L 208.) 
 
One may at first wonder, whether Leibniz, in claiming that there is a “perfect 
correspondence” between ideas and the nature of things, assumes some kind 
of epistemic optimism based on his view of God. However, what he says is 
really meant to follow from his individuative expressivism concerning ideas. 
In fact, it seems rather trivial that if an idea of x is individuated by x, it is 
individuated by the nature of x (what x is).  
At the same time, we can surely ask what this talk of things in 
individuative expressivism involves. If it is not possible to individuate an idea 
without a thing, does it follow that we can only have ideas of what actually 
exist? Here it is helpful to consider Discourse on Metaphysics §26 where Leibniz 
explains that “this quality of our soul, insofar as it [our soul] expresses some 
nature, form, or essence, is properly the idea of the thing” (A VI.iv 1570/AG 
                                                
7 Leibniz’s notion of expression is often explained in terms of isomorphism (see. e.g. Swoyer 
1995). But it seems to us that isomorphism is not enough to account for ideas as expressions, 
although we are not able to pursue this point in detail here. 
8 ‘Expressivism’ as we use it here has of course nothing do with the term as used in contemporary 
philosophy of language and metaethics. 
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58). The emphasis on natures, forms, or essences is actually more adequate 
than the earlier talk of things. For it is not Leibniz’s view that in order for us 
to have an idea of x, x needs to actually exist. We can have ideas of merely 
possible entities, but it does follow that even these should be what we could 
call real possibilities. The important point for our purposes here is that for 
Leibniz the being of ideas necessarily involves reality. (It is worth noticing, 
however, that he further holds that realities need to have a ground in some 
ultimate actual existent (God). 9 As will we see, this grounding of realities in 
something ultimate plays an important role in the argument of Ars Magna.) 
These points about ideas are true of concepts as well. Concepts are, as 
Leibniz says in § 27 of the Discourse, “those [expressions in our soul] we 
conceive or form” (A VI.iv 1572/AG 59). To have an idea is to have “in one’s 
soul” something that expresses the nature of some real possibility; the 
actualization, as we might say, of this idea in thinking is a concept, or a 
conceiving. 
The way of thinking introduced in this section concerning ideas and 
concepts is going to motivate our reconstruction of the Ars Magna argument. 
Before going into details some general points can be made:  
First, it should now be more understandable that Leibniz seems to move 
rather freely from talk of “concepts” to talk of “conceiving things” to talk of 
“things conceived” in his formulation of the argument. This need not be a 
sign of confusion or ambiguity but rather just a sign that what we have called 
individuative expressivism is somehow involved in the argument. Thereby we 
can also arrive at a different understanding of Leibniz’s implicit starting point. 
Rather than (as in L&P’s (7)) take him to set out from our conceiving some 
concept, we take him to begin with our having a cognitive relation to some thing 
or reality.10 This would serve to mitigate Kantian qualms about the possibility 
to reach reality by starting with mere concepts. (At the same time, one might 
wonder whether such a move gives rise to another problem. We will try to say 
something about that at the end of section 5 below.)  
Second, we can now also understand better why, even if conceiving 
something complex requires conceiving its ultimate constituents, there is no 
                                                
9 In addition to the passages from Ars Magna discussed in section 4 below, see also a later writing 
such as the Monadology par. 44 (GP VI 614). 
10 Koistinen (2009, 168) develops a somewhat similar idea in connection to Spinoza. For a helpful 
discussion of related issues in the Aristotelian tradition and Descartes see also Carriero 2009, 17ff. 
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implication of complete analysis – that is, we do not face the sort of worries 
about the nature of conceiving, which seem to arise on L&P’s reconstruction. 
In the case of conceiving a circle, what we conceive is not the concept of a 
circle, but the circle itself – that thing or reality. The relevant constituents are 
not concepts, but further things conceived, i.e. other realities on which 
conceiving the circle depends (for example space). Conceiving, we could 
perhaps say, is not a matter of exercising purely conceptual capacities, but 
involves reality conceived. We hope to clarify this line of thought in the course 
of next section, where we will focus on how Leibniz’s individuative 
expressivism can help us understand how the regress is supposed to be 
blocked. The conception of cognition as essentially involved with reality or 
things will allow us to develop in a different direction L&P’s insight that the 
notion of “borrowing” is important to the argument. For it is as a 
metaphysical notion, rather than as a conceptual one – as in L&P’s Inheritance 
Thesis – that borrowing has a key role to play.  
 
4. Conceiving and Reality-Dependence 
The thesis that some things or realities depend upon other things or realities 
for their reality – for what they are – is central to Leibniz’s metaphysics. He 
elaborates on the thesis in connection with the question of the nature of 
aggregates in a well-known passage from a letter to Arnauld: “every being by 
aggregation presupposes beings endowed with real unity, because every being 
derives its reality only from the reality of those of which it is composed.” (A 
II.ii 184/AG 85.) A herd of sheep (to use one of Leibniz’s examples) is an 
aggregation of sheep, and so the reality of the herd will depend on the reality 
of the sheep. There is, however, another case of reality-dependence – which 
has received somewhat less attention in the literature – but which seems more 
significant for the Ars Magna argument. In this case the dependence runs in 
the opposite direction: rather than one reality depending on a plurality of 
constituent realities, a plurality of realities (finite things) depend on a single 
reality (God). The thought is that we start with God’s being, reality or 
perfection, and that finite things are, as Leibniz explains in Ars Magna, 
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generated through negation or privation (limitation) of that reality.11 Perhaps 
we can think of this relationship between a plurality of realities and a single 
basic reality somewhat along the lines of the way in which there can be a 
plurality of determinations of a single determinable. In Ars Magna Leibniz uses 
the case of figures in space as an analogy for how a multitude of things can be 
generated from a few: “granted space, body, a straight line, and continuous 
motion, one could also demonstrate the possibility of a circle; further, even a 
straight line can be demonstrated, granted space, body and continuous 
motion.” (A VI.iv 159/MP 3.) 
Leibniz characterizes this relation of reality-dependence in terms of one 
thing’s borrowing reality from another (see e.g. LDV 301). It is important to 
notice that the notion of reality-borrowing is very strong. If x depends on y for 
its reality, then the very identity of x – what x is – depends on y. It is not only 
that x could not exist without y, but the specification of what x is, what its 
reality or being is, includes y (what y is): not only does the present existence of 
the herd depend on the sheep, but the specification of the reality of the herd 
includes the sheep (e.g. what the herd does involves the doings of the sheep). 
Similarly, the specification of the reality of determinates will include the 
determinable – a figure, as a description in space, includes space, and the 
specification of the reality of a finite thing includes divine reality. 
The metaphysical thesis of reality-borrowing has important implications 
with respect to the nature of cognition, given Leibniz’s individuative 
expressivism. Let us consider an idea I that expresses reality x, and suppose 
that x borrows its reality from reality y. As I is individuated by the reality 
which it expresses, and reality-borrowing is a matter of the identity of x 
depending on y, it follows that in order for x to be expressed by I, y also needs 
to be expressed, and if the reality of y depends on z, z also needs to be 
expressed by I, and so on. Conversely, if I express x through the idea of y, 
then the reality of x must depend on y, for otherwise I would not be expressing 
x, but some other reality. The order of ideas must follow the order of realities. 
We can sum up this thesis – which we may call the Borrowing Reality-Conceiving 
Principle – in the terminology of Ars Magna by substituting ‘conceiving a thing’ 
for ‘idea’: 
                                                
11 In this connection, he uses a somewhat bewildering analogy with binary numbers (A VI.iv 
156/MP 2). 
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(BC) If, and only if, some thing x borrows its reality from some other 
thing y, then if x is conceived, then y is conceived. 
 
It is easy to see the connection to L&P’s Inheritance Thesis, but also an 
important difference. (IT) is about conceptual content, whereas (BC) involves 
a claim about metaphysical dependence. Indeed, as we just saw, the 
motivation for (BC) lies in the notion of borrowing reality, together with 
individuative expressivism about ideas.  
Does (BC) then help us to block the regress? This is perhaps not quite 
obvious. For at first sight (BC) may seem to be consistent with there being an 
infinite chain of reality-borrowers. The case of the herd of sheep appears to 
offer a good example. The reality of the herd borrows its reality from the 
sheep, but in some sense the sheep themselves are composite beings, and so 
also aggregates, and thus depend for their reality on their parts. Why would 
such a chain of reality-borrowing have to terminate?  
Here we need to introduce a further idea, which Leibniz typically 
presents as a corollary of the notion of reality-borrowing. The idea is clearly 
formulated in a letter to De Volder: “And where there is no reality except that 
which is borrowed, there will never be reality, since it ultimately must be 
proper to some subject [subjecto propria].” (LDV 301.) Why must reality be 
proper to a subject? At one level it is perhaps rather trivial that if A borrows, 
say, a book, then the book must be owned by someone else, who hasn’t herself 
borrowed it. The owner may either be B – the person from which A 
borrowed the book – or someone from whom B has borrowed it, and so on. It 
is, as it were, in the logic of borrowing that the chain of borrowers must 
terminate in an owner. This also helps us to understand how Leibniz can 
intend the case of a deferred gift of some money work as a simile illustrating 
the argument. The point of the simile is that no money is given unless there is 
somewhere some money to be collected. Analogously, if there is no owner, 
there is nothing to be borrowed. 
The real question then is not whether such a chain has to terminate, but 
rather how to make sense of reality-dependence in terms of borrowing. For if 
x borrows its reality from y, not only does the identity of x depends on y, but 
the reality of x is somehow the very same reality as is found in y, and 
ultimately in a “reality owner,” something to which that reality is “proper” – 
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in the same way as the book that I borrow is the very same book that is owned 
by someone else (although in the case of reality it seems as if the idea is that it 
is simultaneously present in both the borrower and the owner). 
In order to make this notion of reality-borrowing seem less abstract, it 
may help to consider the focal case of Ars Magna, where a plurality of things 
are conceived through (and results as limitations or determinations from) 
God. If finite things are determinations of unlimited reality (whatever that 
exactly comes to), it does not seem so far-fetched that it is the same reality that 
is present in each determination. The determinations do not constitute new 
levels of reality, but are just variations of divine reality, just as figures can be 
seen as simply ways in which the very same space is bounded.  
These considerations are not meant to in any way exhaust the nature of 
reality-dependence – there are, for example, important problems about the 
relationship of determinations (finite things) and determinable reality. Our 
aim has merely been to give a sense of the picture that motivates Leibniz to 
think of reality-dependence in terms of borrowing. For it is precisely the 
connection just outlined between borrowing and owning reality that seems to 
us to be the key to seeing how (BC) can help to block the regress in the Ars 
Magna argument. The following Borrowing-Owning Reality Principle is meant to 
capture that connection: 
 
(BO) If there is some thing x that borrows its reality, there must be some 
other thing y that owns that reality, and y is an owner of that reality if, 
and only if, y is not a borrower of that reality (Borrowing-Owning Reality 
Principle). 
 
While (BO) is, as already noted, not supposed to be an independent principle, 
but rather something that follows trivially from (BC), it will be helpful to 
introduce it separately for purposes of reconstructing the argument, which is 
what we will do next.12 
                                                
12 One might perhaps wonder whether this consideration would not be available to L&P: couldn’t 
they too rely on something like (BO), but with respect to conceptual content? This would indeed 
be possible. One advantage with our reading is, however, that the metaphysical principles we rely 
on are to be found in Leibniz’s writings (we do not introduce any new principles about concepts). 
In addition, it seems to us that the other problems with L&P’s reading of the argument (discussed 
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5. The Argument Reconsidered 
We suggested above (see section 3) that there is no ambiguity or confusion in 
Leibniz’s tendency to move between talk of concepts, conceiving of things, 
and things conceived in different versions of the argument – provided we take 
individuative expressivism into consideration. However, for sake of clarity we 
will choose a formulation of the argumetn in terms of conceiving things, as 
this most lucidly conveys what we take to be Leibniz’s view. Thus, in the 
following reconstruction of the argument, we have replaced Leibniz’s 
‘concept’ with ‘conceiving a thing’. We have also chosen to render explicit the 
reference to things by replacing ‘whatever is thought’ (quicquid cogitatur) or 
‘another’ (aliud) with ‘if some thing is thought’ and ‘another thing’. 
Let us then turn to the reconstruction itself: 
 
(1*) If some thing is thought by us, then it is either conceived through 
itself [per se], or conceived through some other thing (assumption). 
(2*) If some thing is conceived through some other thing, then that other 
thing is again either conceived through itself or conceived through 
some other thing (from (1*)). 
(3*) One must either proceed in conceiving one thing through another 
thing to infinity, or all thoughts are resolved into those things which 
are conceived through themselves (from (2*); not a premise in the 
argument). 
(4*) If some thing is conceived only through other things, then it will be 
conceived only insofar as those other things are conceived (only a 
reformulation of 2*). 
(4b) If, and only if, some thing x borrows its reality from some other 
thing y, then if x is conceived, then y is conceived (Borrowing Reality-
Conceiving Principle). 
(4c) If there is some thing x that borrows its reality, there must be some 
other thing y that owns that reality, and y is an owner of that reality 
if, and only if, y is not a borrower of that reality (Borrowing-Owning 
Reality Principle). 
                                                                                                                               
in section 2 above) would remain, for example that it seems to fail to deliver the intended 
conclusion. 
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(4d) If x owns reality, then x is conceived through itself (from 2* and (4b) 
and (4c)). 
(4e) If there is some thing x that borrows its reality from some other 
thing y, then there is some other thing than x that is conceived 
through itself (from (4d) and (4c)). 
(4f) If some thing x is conceived only through some other thing y, then 
there is some other thing than x that is conceived through itself 
(from (4e) and (4b)). 
(5*) If we conceive some thing, then we conceive some thing through 
itself (from (2*) and (4f)).13 
(6*) If nothing is conceived through itself, nothing will be conceived at 
all (from 5*).14 
(7*) We conceive some things (unstated assumption). 
(8*) There is some thing conceived through itself (from (6*), (7*)). 
 
The numbering of the steps is meant to correspond to L&P’s reconstruction, 
(1*) corresponding to their (1) etc., except our (8*), which corresponds to their 
(10). Steps (4b-)–(4f) are steps added in our reconstruction. It is worth noticing 
that, even if it may look a bit complicated, when we formulate the argument 
in terms of conceiving things it actually becomes logically simpler than on 
L&P’s reconstruction:  
Firstly, we do not need anything corresponding to their steps (8) and (9), 
but can move directly from (7*) to the conclusion (8*).  
Secondly, (3*) in our version does not figure as a premise in the 
argument, while L&P need to appeal to (3) in order to arrive at the 
conclusion. Our version seems more in keeping with how Leibniz himself 
presents the consideration about infinity, which we have expressed as (3*).  
Thirdly, L&P need to add (4) – the claim that complex concepts are 
conceived only insofar as their constituents are conceived – as a new 
assumption, an assumption that needs to be motivated (a motivation that 
                                                
13 In Ars Magna Leibniz here writes “conceive something in actuality,” but for purposes of clarity 
we have left out “in actuality,” since we do not think it is meant to add anything substantial, but 
merely works as emphasizing that conceiving is actual conceiving. We also take Leibniz’s 
expression “we arrive at those things which are conceived through themselves” to be equivalent 
to “we conceive some thing through itself”. 
14 This step is of course not necessary, but we include it, since it is included in Ars Magna. 
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raises some difficulties for L&P). Yet when we cast the argument in terms of 
conceiving things it turns out that the corresponding step (4*) is not a new 
assumption, but identical to (2*). It is thus not (4*) that needs to be motivated, 
but the step from (4*) to (5*). That motivation involves appeal to the Borrowing 
Reality-Conceiving Principle and the Borrowing-Owning Reality Principle. We have 
also chosen to articulate in some detail (steps (4b)–(4f)) how these principles 
help to deduce (5*). 
For expository purposes we have left (3*) and (4*) as steps in the 
argument, even though logically speaking they are not needed. 
A possible worry about our reconstruction is that it relies too heavily on 
metaphysical principles ((4b) and (4c)). Another worry has to do with what is, 
as it were, the starting-point of the argument – the claim that we do conceive 
some things (7*). While this formulation avoids what we suggested is a 
problem with L&P’s version – namely that it leaves the step from concepts to 
reality unaccounted for – it is easy to get the feeling that it does so by in some 
sense begging the question. 
With respect to the first worry one could begin by saying that by 
introducing the metaphysical principles, the major gap in the argument is 
filled without otherwise introducing any significant changes in Leibniz’s 
formulation of it. Furthermore, this more metaphysical reconstruction stays 
much closer to the thrust of Leibniz’s argument, expressed in the conclusion 
that there has to be things conceived through themselves – it is an argument 
for the existence of ultimate reality. From a more general perspective, our 
interpretation suggests that Leibniz’s theory of cognition forms a unity with 
his metaphysics. Very few scholars nowadays would agree with Russell’s and 
Couturat’s famous claim that Leibniz’s whole philosophy is based in his logic 
(see Couturat 1901 and Russell 1937). However, recent interpretations still 
tend to retain a logical approach to Leibniz’s theory of concepts (this tendency 
is implicit in L&P’s reading). In contrast, our reading indicates that even the 
theory of concepts cannot be understood apart from his metaphysics. 
The second worry raises some large issues that we cannot go into here. 
The basic question is whether Leibniz’s argument can speak to a more 
general worry (found in, for example, Kant) about the possibility of cognition 
of reality. The focus here would be on step (7*) in our reconstruction, and 
crucial question is how strong that assumption must be. It seems to us that the 
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argument might work even on quite a weak reading of (7*) – i.e. a weak 
understanding of the relevant notion of reality – but this is something that will 
have to be explored on another occasion.15 
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